The European Central Bank as a Policy Entrepreneur within Banking Union by Donnelly, Shawn
1 
 
 
 The European Central Bank as a Policy Entrepreneur within Banking Union 1 
Presented at the Meeting of the European Union Studies Association 
 Boston, 5-7 March, 2015 
Shawn Donnelly2 
1 BANKING UNION AND THE CHALLENGE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 
The European Union, together with the euro zone, negotiated a set of new policies and institutions 
on banking union from 2012 onward to enhance financial stability and resilience within the European 
economy. These policies and institutions comprise the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single 
Resolution Mechanism, a European Deposit Insurance System, and a European public backstop 
mechanism. These individual items represent parts of a financial stability architecture that Europe 
needs to combat crises and prevent contagion before, during and after the onset of a crisis. 
Supervision focuses on crisis prevention through the application of prudential standards. Resolution 
and deposit insurance systems help to prevent a bank’s collapse from initiating contagion: inflicting 
fatal damage on other banks, or instigating panic. Finally, public backstops provide a lender of last 
resort function to the banking sector as a whole when all else fails.  
Most policy analysts saw the euro zone crisis, which amplified Europe’s banking crisis, as an 
opportunity to change that architecture so that it would be fit for purpose in an integrated European 
capital market. A single market with banks doing business across national borders would necessitate 
a supranational architecture of European supervision, resolution authorities, insurance funds and 
public backstops that together could provide robust regulation and emergency response measures. If 
such a move were taken, banks could respond to the continent’s economic downturn by merging, 
restructuring and doing more business across national borders (Véron 2012).  In the absence of a 
new architecture, Europe could only choose between economic and political fragmentation as banks 
retreated behind the relative safety of national borders, supervisors and state guarantees, or chronic 
and persistent financial instability typified by a mis-match between the European scope of banking 
and national responsibility for financial stability (Donnelly 2011).  
What is remarkable about that policy analysis is the high degree of consensus about the functional 
complementarity of the institutional reforms being sought, as well as the necessity of ensuring that 
institutions and banking activity were present at the same level. Functional complementarity means 
that the institutions rely on one another to function properly, so that if one of them is missing, 
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disabled or dysfunctional, that it undermines the ability of the other institutions to do their jobs 
properly. Specifically, supervision works only to the extent that there is a contingency plan if a bank 
must be closed. It therefore requires a functioning resolution and deposit insurance system. These 
systems, in turn, can only prevent systemic collapse if there is a public backstop that steps in when 
special funds for resolution and deposit insurance have been exhausted (De Grauwe 2012). It follows 
that the EU’s financial stability architecture should be supranational, at the EU level, in order to 
provide financial stability for an integrated European capital market.   
To date, the EU’s progress on supplying the institutions of banking union have been patchy and 
incomplete, despite some significant achievements. The Single Supervisory Mechanism has moved 
European bank supervision farthest toward EU-level competence of all the banking union 
innovations. The ECB directly oversees 128 of the EU’s 6000-plus banks, and has powers to influence 
how national supervisors do their jobs, but the jury is out on how strong a grip the ECB will have on 
them. The Single Resolution Mechanism, in contrast, lacks the independent authority to wind down a 
bank, restructure it or otherwise act as a resolution authority is expected to. Instead, it attempts to 
harmonize the approach that national authorities take when confronted with an insolvent bank, and 
makes recommendations to the European Council if the bank is large enough to be directly 
supervised by the ECB. Negotiations on a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, in contrast, have gone 
nowhere. Similarly, negotiations over a public backstop generated the European Stability 
Mechanism, which fell far short of the functional requirements of staving on systemic collapse. 
Two views prevail on whether this is the end of the story, or whether banking union will evolve to 
develop stronger supranational competences over time. Functionalist analysts expect more 
institutions and competences to develop over time; students of power politics expect that the end of 
the line has effectively been reached, in which national governments will block further progress 
toward supranational institutions.  
Functionalists point to two developments in support of their claim: that despite the initial resistance 
of many EU governments to relinquish the ties they have to their own banks, that many, particularly 
those in the distressed states of southern Europe, saw the benefit of collective action quickly and 
lined up to support supranational regulatory power and financial resources in the banking sector 
(Spendzharova 2014). In turn, they saw that Germany, the principal opponent of such 
supranationalism, gradually dropped some of its objections on supervision, resolution and cross-
border financial assistance in order to ensure a bare minimum of financial stability in the EU. The 
second development is that the ECB successfully built out its own claim to supervisory authority from 
25 to 120 banks, which might imply that it will be able in the future to claim additional supranational 
powers that Germany had not intended to delegate. 
Students of power politics point to the massive gap between the demands that functionalists made 
for a European financial stability architecture and the apparent unwillingness of European 
governments to transfer those tasks to the EU (Donnelly 2013, Helleiner 2014). This could be seen in 
the ubiquitous presence of national authorities in all institutions and mechanisms related to banking 
union, as well as in the national dominance and control of financial resources, particularly in public 
backstops. They also point to the manner in which southern Europe and Ireland in particular found 
themselves at the losing end of a power play to distribute the costs and benefits of financial stability 
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in Europe. Those countries found themselves trapped between speculative financial markets that 
would flee any country in which they had lost confidence, and a trio of states—Germany, the 
Netherlands and Finland—intent on demanding international treaty obligations and constitutional 
amendments from other states that forced their EU neighbours to pay for resolution and deposit 
insurance themselves, and to balance their budgets in perpetuity, limiting their ability to provide a 
public backstop. Rather than a European banking union with fully functioning EU institutions, Europe 
came out of the negotiation process for the most part with a fragmented collection of national 
banking systems supported by national authorities, some of which would lack the financial resources 
to guarantee its safety of any sizeable banking sector. 
This paper takes the position that on balance, the students of power politics can explain more of 
what has happened, and that the implications must be made apparent, so that banking and financial 
stability continue to operate sufficiently at the same level. The reality of national responsibility for 
financial stability means that most EU countries, including non-euro zone countries, and southern 
European countries in the euro zone in particular, have very strong incentives to shrink and 
deleverage their banking sectors until such time as the economy in general and public finances have 
grown to support it properly as a lender of last resort. There are only two ways to achieve this fiscal 
capacity relative to banking activity, however. One possibility is that the peripheral economies of 
southern and eastern Europe will have to divert resources from consumption into export production 
and generate significant current account surpluses that in turn allow public budget surpluses without 
suppressing economic activity. To the extent that an export-led diversion of resources is not possible, 
however, it means that a massive internal devaluation of more than 30%, with an attendant 
contraction of domestic banking (Tilford, 2014). This would also do the trick, at the cost of domestic 
banks disappearing from the market, to be replaced (likely) by foreign competitors (Epstein 2008). 
Financial stability would then be more complex, being tied more strongly to foreign conditions 
(Epstein 2013). 
This paper also cautions, however, that the trajectory taken is probably unsustainable, given the 
massive costs that it imposes on most EU governments, and given the EU’s poor track record to date 
on forcing such adjustments on national governments and electorates. This track record, and the 
implications it has for financial stability, harbours a new round of the euro zone crisis in the medium 
term as sources of bank and sovereign insolvency continue to reinforce one another (De Grauwe 
2013). 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 briefly examine the functional 
requirements for supervision, and resolution and deposit insurance respectively, and outline the 
existing institutional features. It also outlines why the EU has not been able to agree on deposit 
insurance. Section 4 briefly outlines the arguments for public backstops and what they would look 
like at the European level, and contrasts them with the provisions of the European Stability 
Mechanism and of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), which deal with 
collective capacity and individual state capacity respectively. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 BANK SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 
Bank supervision applies regulatory rules and principles in such a way that serious threats to the 
liquidity and solvency of banks are known, so that they can be dealt with to the extent that they 
cannot be avoided through prudent behaviour in the first place. A supervisor may be involved in the 
establishment of rules, particularly to the degree that legislation gives it significant leeway in 
interpreting and applying regulatory principles. Supervision covers a number of tasks: prudential 
standards on corporate governance (how the bank is organized and steered), financial reporting 
(timeliness, comprehensiveness, accuracy, transparency) and capital adequacy (leverage and equity 
ratios, asset quality and risk weighting). Ensuring capital adequacy is focused on here as the most 
important task at hand in the European scenario.   
Capital adequacy standards are designed to ensure that banks have enough capital on hand to meet 
their regular repayment obligations and to compensate for any decline in income or asset value. The 
supervisor is therefore responsible for ensuring that it has an accurate picture of the bank’s assets 
and liabilities, that banks hold a certain percentage of their capital in cash or extremely safe 
securities, and that they set aside more cash as they invest in riskier and riskier assets. Global 
standards on capital adequacy (Basel III), modified by the EU (Capital Requirements Directive IV and 
Capital Requirements Regulation) constitute the static benchmarks that banks must meet and that 
the supervisor must test. 
The supervisor’s  assessments also need to be forward-looking and reflect possible negative trends. 
This is all the more important in a market where the economy is weak and fragile, where the risk of a 
major credit event (such as the bankruptcy of a major bank or national government) is medium to 
high, and where stocks, bonds, derivatives and other asset prices are subject to significant 
downswings. The supervisor needs to do this via a stress test, which establishes a hypothetical 
scenario and models whether the bank would survive the downturn or credit event. 
In this context, supervisors have found themselves torn between wanting to bring the banks back to 
health quickly by exposing weaknesses that force corrective action, and instilling confidence in 
financial markets that the adjustments demanded are manageable and incremental in nature. This 
can mean fudging the results to paint a slightly better picture of the bank’s balances than might 
otherwise be indicated. In the European Union, the European Banking Authority, which gained the 
responsibility for stress testing before the establishment of the ECB as the single supervisor, and held 
onto that role in the SSM, has shown little independent will to apply stress testing rigorously. The 
result is that the EBA demonstrated limited capacity to restrict forbearance by national supervisors, 
in which supervisors deliberately overlooked toxic assets and insufficient capital buffers. The 
consequence in more than one case was the failure of supervision to generate an early warning of 
problems, or to force corrective action. The EBA’s internal political obstacles were also shown in its 
choice of scenarios that would be included in stress tests. At the time when the European Council 
negotiated a restructuring of Greek sovereign debt, for example, the EBA refused to include such a 
scenario in its 2011 stress tests. Nor was the EBA able to intervene or impose consequences when 
German banks pulled out of stress testing the following year, with the approval and protection of 
their national supervisor. All of these outcomes were reasons to take stress testing away from the 
EBA—an intergovernmental body—and place it with the ECB, a supranational one, but the member 
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states would not agree to it. The ECB’s will not be able to supervise properly without ensuring stress 
testing quality.  
However, the ECB has not disappointed those who expected it to pursue innovative measures to 
counter national protectionism, foot dragging and forbearance. Alongside the EBA’s stress tests, the 
ECB decided to conduct its own review of the assets on bank balance sheets in advance of the stress 
tests, in an exercise known as the Asset Quality Review, or AQR. The idea was that the AQR would 
expose at least the assets on bank balance sheets to scrutiny, so that that part of the equation could 
not be hidden, downgraded or ignored in the stress test that would follow. The principal challenge 
the ECB encountered was the lack of staff to do this job independently. In response, it turned to an 
independent company to assist it. However, that company had been involved in stress testing before 
that had not fared better. It therefore remains to be seen whether the AQR exercise will be 
successful in ensuring a fair and rigorous stress test by the national supervisors acting in concert 
within the EBA.  
The stress tests themselves will rely in part on the accuracy of the information on asset quality, the 
risks associated with them, and on leverage. They will also rely on the rigour with which the stress 
scenarios are conducted and carried out. This means not only the assumption of what 
macroeconomic or credit events might confront European banks, but also what options would be 
available to banks to protect their solvency under deteriorating market conditions. Open questions 
about the methodologies used by the private contractor in the AQR have already been raised—with 
particular reference to the capacity of banks to sell some assets—particularly derivatives—for cash 
during a downturn. As the 2008 crisis showed, it is unwise to assume that such instruments are liquid 
during a crisis. 
Nevertheless, stress tests do have some effect, which is that it puts pressure on banks to raise capital  
(equity) they might otherwise not. To date, stress testing has in effect been handled by national 
supervisors. This had the following effects: (1) the shedding of foreign exposures, which the 
supervisor deemed as riskier, whereby the banking market in Europe became increasingly 
renationalized, and (2) increased equity – in which banks sell additional shares on the stock market 
and hold the cash as a strategic reserve. However, these equity-raising exercises appear to never be 
enough, turning into an annual exercise since the onset of the crisis. This raises the question of 
whether  (3) national supervisors were exercising forbearance on the worst of the banks’ problems, 
and whether (4) zombie banks would persist as a result. Will the EBA’s stress tests have the same 
effect as its previous exercises, or will the AQR ensure that more pressure is applied to be more 
rigorous, as the ECB would like to see? Only time will tell, but the ECB’s decisive action is a key step in 
the right direction, on its own initiative. 
Overall, supervision has taken a step change toward greater strength, independence and rigour 
under the establishment of the SSM. It is by far the greatest success of banking union so far. It is also 
the element of banking union that had the strongest German support, since Germany insisted on 
rigorous supervision of banks if it were also to support the establishment of the European Stability 
Mechanism as an emergency fund for bailing out failing banks in the euro zone.  
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3 BANK RESOLUTION  
Unlike supervision, Europe has found it far more difficult to agree on resolution and deposit 
insurance authorities, and the funds that go with them to make the job of those authorities possible. 
Bank resolution takes place when a bank can no longer survive without assistance, and where a 
decision has been made to wind it down in a controlled fashion rather than prop it up with public 
money or risk an uncontrolled collapse that ripples throughout the financial system. The capacity to 
do so is therefore considered an essential part of tackling the too big to fail (TBTF) problem that 
confronted public authorities worldwide at the onset of the crisis, and in breaking the negative 
feedback loop between banks and sovereigns within the euro zone. 
Resolution takes place by any combination of four mechanisms: asset separation transfer, asset 
transfer and bail-ins, in addition to liquidity injections. These tools must be used decisively and 
quickly in the event of an impending bankruptcy by a resolution authority empowered to intervene in 
the rights of shareholders, bondholders, and depositors, and with access to sufficient funds to ensure 
that no other parties are so severely damaged that they collapse themselves as a result of the 
changes. Asset separation refers to removing toxic assets from a bank’s balance sheet and 
transferring them to a special purpose vehicle, typically a state-run institution known as a bad bank. 
Asset transfer refers to the sale of (valuable) assets to other banks in the event that the original bank 
is allowed to die and the useful assets are being harvested, or to a newly-created counterpart to the 
bad bank, known as a good bank. A variation of this is wholesale transfer of ownership, in which the 
ailing bank is sold to a competitor, which then carries on the business. Bail-ins force bondholders and 
unsecured creditors to whom the bank owes money to accept partial or even total losses on the 
value of their investments. Doing so reduces the bank’s liabilities. After a certain bail-in threshold, 
however, those losses will trigger collapses of other banks that hold those bonds. When this 
threshold is reached, capital injections need to be used to counter any shortfall that would otherwise 
create a systemic crisis. To avoid moral hazard by banks, who might otherwise rely on taxpayers to 
fund them in a crisis, and to increase the availability of funds to fulfil this purpose, the first line of 
capital injections needs to come from a resolution fund that banks themselves pay for, and pay into 
in advance of a crisis (ex ante funding).  The size must be sufficient to intervene in the collapse of one 
or a few banks that the resolution authority can use at its discretion. Behind this, there must be a 
public backstop (discussed below) when the resolution fund is depleted. 
The first stage of the economic crisis involved a significant effort by national governments, with the 
approval of the European Commission, to prop up failing banks with various forms of state aid and 
direct measures, ranging from capital injections and public guarantees on the assets on bank balance 
sheets to direct public ownership. During the euro zone crisis that followed, resolution became a 
more frequent occurrence as the problems that banks and governments faced both worsened. 
Assets and income flows became worth increasingly less for banks as the economy deteriorated and 
the first debt restructurings in Greece took place. Governments, meanwhile found their fiscal 
positions dramatically worsened by rising expenditure, declining tax revenue, and for southern 
Europe in particular, rising interest rates that had to be paid to bond markets in exchange for 
investing in treasury bills. This combination of circumstances meant that national authorities 
engaged in resolving national banks increasingly from 2011 onward. This underlined the ECB’s 2012 
demands that if the EU’s single market in capital should not be torn apart, that a European resolution 
7 
 
 
authority with sufficient capital to prevent a bank’s closure from undermining other banks would 
have to be agreed. 
In the negotiations that followed for a single resolution mechanism, the member states of the EU 
found themselves at odds with the ECB, Commission and Parliament over two issues: resolution 
authority, and a resolution fund. Whereas the European institutions promoted an EU-level authority 
with the power to undertake all decisions and actions independently, the Council insisted on the 
primacy of national authorities, with an added EU layer to deal with the 128 banks being supervised 
directly by the ECB, dominated again by the member states. The Single Resolution Board was 
established as an advisory body to the European Commission regarding the resolution of euro zone 
banks, and as a forum for coordinating the efforts of national resolution supervisors when dealing 
with a bank that is significantly represented in more than one member state. The Commission 
decides on the advice of the Board whether to initiate resolution proceedings, which first must 
secure the approval of the Council. In terms of decision making, the SRM is far more of an 
intergovernmental body than a supranational one, given its structure and capacity to act quickly. 
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive  also agreed to the erection of a resolution fund, into 
which banks themselves would pay, reflecting expectations from the banking supervision community 
that such funds were required to carry out a resolution without threatening to undermine the 
stability of the financial system as a whole. However, there were four  problems with the fund that 
undermine its capacity to play that role. The first element is size. Whereas comparable banking 
systems indicated that the SRM would need more than 300 billion euros in funds, the member states 
agreed to 55 billion. The second is the long transition period  before the national contributions 
agreed would be paid up—to 2026. The third element is the creation of national compartments. 
Monies paid into the fund over time could only used in the resolution of banks from the same 
country until future provisions for mutualisation take effect. The fourth is the political difficulty with 
which the moneys could be released.  Rather than leading to legal and political certainty of the EU 
level to act, and the financial capacity to do so, the SRM still effectively ensures that national 
resolution authorities and funds are responsible for dealing with bank collapses (Howarth and 
Quaglia 2014). This again raises the prospect, together with national responsibility for supervision in 
most cases, of forbearance, zombie banks and the continuing balkanization and Japanization of the 
European economy, resulting in a fragmented capital market and a stagnant economy.  This effect is 
likely to be strongest in those countries of the euro zone where economic decline has been the 
strongest, the challenges to bank viability are therefore strongest, and where the capacity of 
government to provide public backstops is the weakest. That component is discussed next. 
 
4  PUBLIC BACKSTOPS 
Resolution and deposit insurance funds are meant for single banks in difficulty. They cannot hold up 
to systemic crises. For that reason, a public backstop serving as a lender of last resort, particularly 
where the central bank is unable to do so, is deemed necessary for financial stability. The impact of 
the euro zone crisis, which undermined the capacity of some national governments to provide that 
kind of public backstop, was strongest in those countries where financial markets most strongly 
doubted the capacity of the national government to repay what they had borrowed. The larger the 
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banking sector and the riskier the investment profile, the stronger the need for a public backstop 
that exceeds the capacity of resolution funds and deposit guarantee systems to handle. 
In this context, two European initiatives, both spearheaded by the German government with the 
support of the Netherlands and Finland, provided for emergency support on the one hand, but in 
general, further restricted the capacity of national government to provide a public backstop. Those 
two initiatives were the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) and the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Both treaties were negotiated, agreed and tabled for ratification 
simultaneously, with a clause insisting that only signatories of the TSCG would be eligible for financial 
assistance through the ESM. The TSCG, now signed by all EU member states save the UK, Croatia and 
the Czech Republic, commits governments to balance their budgets in perpetuity, and to build down 
their debt levels. This severely limits the capacity of national governments to fulfil the lender of last 
resort function, regardless of escape clauses in the treaty allowing extra borrowing in time of crisis. 
The ESM provides financial assistance to countries that have exhausted their capacity to borrow on 
private capital markets, but in ways that increase the strain on the broader European banking sector 
as a result of the terms and conditions it attaches to disbursing aid. In the public sector, governments 
must engage in budget retrenchment, structural reforms and internal devaluation in return for the 
release of financial assistance from the ESM. In the private sector, which means for the purpose of 
funding insolvent banks, the terms and conditions of financial assistance include a cap of 60 billion 
euros for the entire euro zone, meaning heavy reliance on bank closures,  resolutions and the 
extensive use of bail-ins for investors and uninsured depositors. Many of those investors are other 
banks that then may experience difficulties of their own, and whose public authorities may or may 
not have the capacity to support them if the strain becomes too great. The scenario of  such a 
domino effect loomed briefly during the resolution of Laiki Bank in Cyprus in 2013, when the head of 
the euro group stated that depositors would also lose their insured savings, opening up prospects 
that depositors across southern Europe would flee to safer havens in the north (Salmon 2013). 
Although the German finance minister ensured quickly that depositors and market knew that the 
ESM would not attach such destabilizing conditions to the provision of aid through the ESM, he also 
underlined that the ESM was designed for emergencies only, and not designed to significantly 
enhance the deployment of public backstops. Those capacities remain at the national level, and 
unevenly distributed, with the consequence that the EU’s financially weaker governments will remain 
sources of enhanced instability risk. Although the Single Resolution Fund can borrow limited amounts 
on financial markets, a systemic event is likely to require direct liquidity creation by the ECB (Chang 
and Leblond 2014, Leblond 2014). 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The first attempt to create the supranational institutions of a banking union met with some success, 
but far less than would be required to ensure the institutional complementarity required to supply 
financial stability at the European level. Much in the same way that EMU was established with a 
European institution in monetary policy but national authority in fiscal policy, banking union was 
established with the ECB as the lead banking supervisor, but national responsibility for supervising 
most banks, setting how high the regulatory bar would be set, and undertaking the politically 
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sensitive stress tests that one would expect a supervisor to do. Where European institutions were 
involved in these functions, it was the EBA that handled them, the body that itself admitted paralysis 
at the hand of protectionist national authorities and whose inability to act led to the ECB’s 
appointment as supervisor in the first place. Resolution systems were coordinated rather than 
Europeanised, plans for European deposit insurance schemes failed to bear fruit, and the provision of 
a public backstop was all but prevented. Rather than a European architecture that provides for 
financial stability at the European level, the European institutions that were established largely 
provided for supervision, resolution and public backstops at the national level. 
Nevertheless, European institutions have been established, and It remains to be seen whether the 
restrictions placed on the ECB and the Resolution Board will restrain them from further growth. The 
capacity of the ECB to advance its own agenda and powers under significant opposition in both the 
management of EMU and in its role as bank supervisor, even if not to the extent it would like, 
suggests that it will step in in innovative ways where required. This can be expected not only in the 
realm of supervision, where the ECB will have the incentive to be tough in reviewing asset quality, 
but also in the realm of stress testing, which officially remains the EBA’s responsibility, and in the 
realm of coordinating and directing national supervisors. The institutional blockages in resolution are 
stronger, but the ECB can choose to act aggressively in ways that forces the Board, and thereby the 
Council, to react. 
The primary reason why there may be limits on the ECB’s capacity to forge forward in these ways is 
that it lacks control of a highly intergovernmental resolution process, and a situation in which 
resolution funds, capital injections and public backstops may be undersupplied. In those situations, 
the ECB’s role as supervisor will clash with its mission to underpin financial stability, placing it in a 
difficult position. 
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